Abstract-To detect the malicious meters committing electricity theft in a neighborhood area smart grid, in this paper, a novel inspection algorithm, termed as the Binary-Coded Groupingbased Inspection (BCGI) algorithm, is proposed. In the proposed algorithm, each meter is identified with a unique binary-coded number. The BCGI algorithm can locate the unique malicious meter (if any) by one inspection step under the assumption that at most one meter becomes malicious in one reporting period. Furthermore, by controlling the reporting periods of meters, we could make the probability of the event that at most one meter becomes malicious in one reporting period arbitrarily close to 1 under some assumptions. We further extend the algorithm into a Generalized BCGI algorithm (G-BCGI) to deal with the case that there are two or more meters which happen to commit the theft of electricity in one reporting period. Simulation results demonstrate the inspection efficiency of the BCGI and G-BCGI algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increased connectivity, the smart grid will lead a myriad of new manipulating methods to steal the electricity [1] , [2] . The manipulating methods are mainly summarized as follows: metering tampering, wire partial bypass of the meter inside the meter enclosure, and complete bypass of the meter from the low-voltage grid. The electricity bill can be compromised: a) while it is recorded, b) while it is at rest in the meter, and c) as it is in flight across the network [1] . It has been estimated that utility companies worldwide lose more than $25 billion every year due to the theft of electricity. For India alone, the loss is around $4.5 billion [3] , $1.5 billion less than the United States [4] .
Many works have been done to prevent the electricity theft, mainly including two categories -the machine learning theory-based method [5] - [9] and the real-time comparisonbased method [10] - [15] . The former method [5] - [9] predicts the current service amount according to the historical data on electricity consumption. If the reading of one smart meter has significant deviation from the predicted electricity amount, then the corresponding user will be considered as "malicious". However, it is inaccurate to declare electricity theft only by the occurrence of deviation, since there are many other reasons, such as the dramatic change of weather and the random behavior of power consumers, may lead the deviation * Corresponding author.
as well. To this end, the papers [10] - [15] developed a series of algorithms based on real-time comparison, whose basic idea is to install two smart meters with one electric wire connecting the subscriber and the power provider. If the disputes between subscribers and the power provider exceed a specified threshold [11] , corresponding meters are recognized as "malicious". However, there are at least two limitations of the real-time comparison-based method. One is the cost issue. As aforementioned, every user needs one inspector in [10] - [15] for real-time comparison, where the inspector is a special meter used for the inspection process [10] . As a result, the cost of installing inspectors becomes unaffordable when the users are numerous. The other is the inspection speed. Existing works exploit the intersected grouping technology [15] to accelerate the inspection speed. However, the way of grouping users is not given and consequently the inspection speed is not guaranteed.
To address the limitations of [10] - [15] , this paper proposes a novel Binary-Coded Grouping-based Inspection (BCGI) algorithm, which consists of two phases -the grouping phase and the inspecting phase. Under the assumption that at most one meter becomes malicious in one reporting period, the BCGI algorithm can locate the unique malicious meter (if any) by one inspection step. Furthermore, by controlling the reporting periods of meters, we could make the probability of the event that at most one meter becomes malicious in one reporting period arbitrarily close to 1 under some assumptions. We further extend the algorithm into a Generalized BCGI algorithm (G-BCGI) to deal with the case that there are two or more meters which happen to commit the theft of electricity in one reporting period. Finally, this work is comprehensively compared with the Scanning method [10] via simulations and comparison results demonstrate the efficiency of the BCGI and G-BCGI algorithms.
In contrast to previous work [10] - [15] , this work has the following advantages.
• The number of the inspectors needed by BCGI is Θ(log 2 (n)) 1 (n is the number of meters), which is a significant improvement in comparison to the Scanning Fig. 1 . Smart grid in neighborhood area [15] method (Θ(n)) [10] .
• The BCGI provides a novel grouping process of the meters and locates the unique malicious meter (if any) by one inspection step if the reporting period of meters is selected sufficiently small.
• Despite of a slight increase in inspection steps, the G-BCGI algorithm can handle the case that two or more meters become malicious in one reporting period with only Θ(log 2 ( √ n)) inspectors.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Architecture and Assumptions
Fig . 1 illustrates the basic architecture of smart grid in neighborhood area [15] . As shown in Fig. 1 , each building is equipped with a smart meter to record the service amount of the users. The smart meter can exchange information not only directly with the utilities through the public communication network (e.g., the Internet or the public switched telephone network [PSTN] [1] ), but also with the central observer meters, i.e., inspectors, in the distribution room. Each inspector is in charge of a group of smart meters.
Consider a smart grid in neighborhood area (e.g., an apartment building) with a total of n users periodically sending their service amounts to the utilities. Among all the users, there are m (m ≤ n) users who would compromise their meters at some stochastic moments in the near future, being denoted as "potentially malicious" users. We assume that there are no malicious users at the beginning of the inspecting process, which is reasonable when the neighborhood area smart grid is newly established.
For ease of exposure, we define the state transition of each meter from "potentially malicious" to "malicious" as a "variant". Despite the fact that we cannot predict the accurate "variant" time, it will definitely happen within a certain period of time T , which varies from days to months for each "potentially malicious" user .
B. The Basic Investigating Scheme
The inspectors compare their own readings real-time with the summation of all the reported readings. The two readings are usually not expected to be equal due to the following reasons: power loss during power transfer, measuring errors caused by communication delays and synchronization issues, dynamic factors caused by the environment (e.g., weather), and the theft of electricity [11] . The first three reasons belong to technical loss which can be reduced by improving the infrastructure of the smart grid, whereas the theft of electricity lies in the scope of non-technical loss. Technical loss can always be estimated empirically in a specific range of the total distributed energy. If the difference between the two readings exceeds a certain threshold, the corresponding inspector is denoted as "dirty", and this indicates that its group contains malicious users. Let N I and G i denote the set of inspectors and the group of smart meters affiliated with inspector i (i ∈ N I ), respectively. Then the condition of declaring inspector i "dirty" is given by
where function R(x) denotes the reading of meter x (either an inspector or a smart meter), and δ (u) denotes the specified threshold (i.e., technical loss) of meter u [10] .
III. BINARY-CODED GROUPING-BASED INSPECTION
The BCGI algorithm consists of two phases: the grouping phase and the inspecting phase. During the grouping phase, smart meters are grouped according to the 1 bits of their own unique binary numbers. In the inspecting phase, the unique variant meter is identified by only one inspection step.
A. Grouping Phase
First, the meters are randomly assigned with unique numbers from 1 to n. Then, the ID of each meter is encoded into a binary sequence, in which the k-th "1" digit indicates that the specific meter is assigned to the k-th group monitored by inspector k. As an example in Fig. 2 , there are 7 smart meters recording the amount of electricity service, and 3 inspectors inspecting the readings of the 7 meters. The meter numbered by 1 is coded into 001, indicating that it belongs to the first group inspected by inspector 1; and the meter numbered by 7 is coded into 111, indicating that inspectors 1, 2 and 3 jointly inspect its reading. As a result, the 7 meters are divided into three groups. In other words, only three inspectors are needed to monitor the 7 meters. To summarize, the grouping process of the BCGI algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Grouping Algorithm
Input:
meter array: an array containing meters' number Output:
|N I |: the number of needed inspectors; G: the grouping result 1: n = sizeof(meter array); 2: |N I | = log 2 (n + 1)
// calculating N I 3: for i = 0; i < n; i + + do for j = 1; j ≤ N I ; j + + do 6: if (the jth bit of Binary(i + 1, N I ) ==1 then 
B. Inspecting Phase
Next, we exemplify how the BCGI algorithm works during the inspecting phase. If a variant meter appears in one group, the inspector in charge of it will become "dirty". For example, meter 6 (110) is the unique variant meter in Fig. 2 . When meter 6 send fraudulent meter readings to inspectors 2 and 3, the states of inspectors 2 and 3 will become "dirty" (in yellow), whereas inspector 1 remains "clean". As we use "1" and "0" to indicate the "dirty" state and "clean" state, respectively, the states of the inspector groups can be correspondingly described by a binary sequence "110", which is exactly the ID of malicious user (meter 6), and this was shown exactly on the top of Fig. 2 . To summarize, the inspecting process of the BCGI algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. 
C. Analysis of the Algorithm
Let N I denote the the set of inspectors, and we have the following theorem and lemmas. Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 trivially follows the fact that log 2 n +1 = log 2 (n+1) bits are needed to represent integer n.
According to Lemma 1, only ten inspectors are needed to inspect 1023 smart meters.
Lemma 2. Given n meters, each group includes at most n 2
meters.
Proof. The mathematical induction method is adopted to prove Lemma 2. For the fundamental case, when n = 2, there is one meter in each group; and when n = 3, two meters are contained in each group. Next, assuming that n = 2k, k ∈ N, there are less than = k + 1 members in this special group. Similarly, we can prove that each group contains at most n 2 members when n = 2k + 1. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3. Given n meters, the number of members in the N Ith group is n − (2 |N
I
Lemma 4. Given n meters, the N I -th group always contains the fewest number of members among all the groups.
Proof. Obviously, Lemma 4 is equivalent to the following inequality ∀n ∈ [2 |N
When n = 2 |N I | − 1, the left hand side of the above inequality equates 1 and the right hand side is equal or greater than 1. Additionally, the function f (n) = n−(2 |N I |−1 −1) is monotonic increasing with respect to n. Therefore, the above inequality holds and so does Lemma 4.
D. Choosing the Reporting Period
The occurrence of a "variant" is to a large extent similar to the eruption of a volcano, which was well formulated by a Poisson process [16] . Therefore, this subsection adopts the Poisson process to model the variant process of potentially malicious meters. Suppose that the variant of m "potentially malicious" users would be accomplished by time T . Given a reporting period t, the average occurrence rate of the variant during period t is given by λ = mt T . Therefore, the probability density function of variants number during time interval [t 0 ,t 0 + t], t 0 , t ≥ 0 is [17] 
By carefully choosing an appropriate reporting period, we can make sure that the probability of two or more users committing the theft of electricity during period t is bounded by an arbitrarily small ε. Specifically,
where N(t 0 ,t 0 + t) denotes the number of variants during the time interval
According to the Lambert W function [18] , we can obtain
where "e" denotes the natural constant. Therefore, we can easily obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. By controlling the reporting periods of meters, we could make the probability of the event that at most one meter becomes malicious in one reporting period arbitrarily close to 1 under the Poisson process assumption.
Fig . 3 depicts the maximum reporting period t max for three cases: T = 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, for ε = 0.05. In Fig. 3 , we observe that t max quickly decreases as m (the number of the "potentially malicious" meters) increases. Additionally, for any fixed m, the big T always yields the large t max .
IV. GENERALIZED BCGI ALGORITHM
In Section III, we have mentioned that the probability of two or more meters becoming variant during one short period can be made arbitrarily small. Nevertheless, the extensive meter reports may cause large overhead for the smart grid. Hence, as an alternative strategy, in this section, we propose a Generalized BCGI (G-BCGI) algorithm which aims for handling two or more variants during a reporting period. We will first present the G-BCGI algorithm for detecting at most two malicious meters in one reporting period (denoted by G-BCGI 2 ) and then discuss the design of G-BCGI k with k ≥ 3.
For G-BCGI 2 , let Ω denote the set of the meters to be checked, and n = |Ω|. First, all the meters are randomly distributed in a c × c lattice S (with an example shown in Fig. 4) , where c = n denotes the number of the columns of lattice S. Then Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are applied to group and inspect the columns of the lattice, respectively. According to Lemma 1, the number of the needed inspectors is |N I | = log 2 (c + 1) . Obviously, the meters which are inspected by a "clean" inspector can be removed from Ω, i.e., Ω = Ω − i∈N CI M i , where N CI denotes the set of the clean inspectors, and M i denotes the set of meters inspected by the i-th inspector. As the cardinality of Ω decreases, the quantity of inspectors (i.e., N I ) for grouping S is also reduced. Let N I Initial denote the set of the inspectors which are used to inspect the initial S. Let N RI = N I Initial − N I denote the set of redundant inspectors. |N RI | columns of the smaller S (c is updated because that Ω is updated) are randomly chosen for further inspection, with each chosen column uniquely inspected by one redundant inspector. Two cases are discussed here: (1) If all of the redundant inspectors are "clean", then the set Ω is further reduced, i.e., Ω = Ω − i∈N RI M i . When the number of the meters in Ω is less than 2 |N I Initial |, the Scanning method is applied at most twice to locate the two malicious meters. (2) If one or more redundant inspectors are dirty, we can claim that one malicious meter is in the column inspected by a "dirty" redundant inspector, and the other is in one of the other columns. Therefore, we can separately locate them with the BCGI algorithm. The above G-BCGI 2 is formulated in Algorithm 3.
As an example shown in Fig. 4(a) , all of the 16 meters are randomly distributed in a 4 × 4 lattice, and the two malicious meters are represented with the red dots. After grouping and inspecting the four columns, the binary sequence of the three inspectors is "110", from which we can infer that the meters in the first and third columns are good meters. Hence, the number of the meters to be checked is reduced to 8(< 9) and these 8 meters is again randomly distributed in a 3 × 3 lattice. At this time, only two inspectors are needed to group and inspect the 3 × 3 lattice; and the third redundant inspector randomly chooses one column of the lattice for further inspection. As shown in Fig. 4(b) , if the second column is chosen (case (a), in Fig. 4(a) ), then we can claim that one malicious meter is distributed in the second column, and the other must be distributed in one of the other two columns. If the third column is chosen (case (b), in Fig. 4(b) ), then the number of meters for further inspection will be 6. No matter which case it is, we can locate the two malicious users by another two inspection steps (with BCGI for case (a) and Scanning method for case (b)). Overall, all of the needed inspection steps of G-BCGI 2 is 4.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of BCGI and G-BCGI 2 from two aspects: the number of the needed inspectors N I and the number of inspection steps N S .
Algorithm 3 G-BCGI 2
Input:
Ω: set of meters to be checked; Output:
N S : the number of inspection steps; 1: f lag1 = 0, f lag2 = 0, f lag3 = 0; N S = 0; 2: repeat 3: if f lag2 == 0|| f lag3 == 0 then 
Randomly choosing |N RI | columns in lattice S, each provided with a redundant inspector for further inspection; 18: if there exist "dirty" redundant inspectors then A. BCGI Fig. 5(a) compares the BCGI algorithm with the Scanning method in terms of the number of the needed inspectors. As shown in Fig. 5(a) , the number of inspectors for the Scanning method is the same as the total number of meters, while the BCGI saves significant amount of inspectors, especially when the number of meters is large. Fig.5(b) evaluates the performance of BCGI algorithm with comparison to the Scanning method, with the same number of inspectors and in the metric of bounds of N S , in the worst and the average cases, respectively. Notice that, for fair comparison each piece of data in Fig.5(b) is based upon the average value of 100 repeats. With the increase of the total number of meters, the advantages of the BCGI algorithm will become more prominent. Fig. 6 (a) compares G-BCGI 2 with the Scanning method in terms of the number of the needed inspectors. From Fig.  6(a) , we can observe that with the same inspection steps, the Scanning method needs much more inspectors than G-BCGI 2 . Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 5(a) demonstrate the cost efficiency of our proposed work. Fig. 6 (b) compares G-BCGI 2 with the Scanning method in terms of the bounds of N S . Again, each piece of data in Fig.  6(b) is based upon the average value of 100 repeats. From Fig. 6(b) , we can clearly observe that when the number of the meters arrives at 49 and 225, the average numbers of inspection steps were significantly decreased. This is because that with the increasing of the number of meters, the number of the inspectors used to group and inspect the columns of the square also increases, and this makes the suspicious domain narrow down much faster.
B. G-BCGI 2
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Binary-Coded Grouping-based Inspection (BCGI) algorithm for identifying the malicious meters committing electricity theft in a neighborhood area smart grid. In the algorithm, we label each meter with one unique binary-coded number and assign meters to inspectors according to the 1 bits of their binary-coded numbers. By only one inspection step, the BCGI algorithm can locate the unique malicious meter if there is one meter becomes malicious in one reporting period (or the reporting period of meters is chosen sufficiently small). For extending the application scope of the BCGI algorithm, we proposed a Generalized BCGI (G-BCGI) algorithm which suites the case that two or more meters become variant during one common reporting period. Simulation results show that both the BCGI and G-BCGI algorithms outperform the Scanning method in terms of the number of inspectors and the inspection speed.
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